Introduction
Within EU studies, there has been an increasing recognition that the celebrated 'big bangs' agreements do not materialize by themselves. History-making negotiations that conclude constitutional negotiations in intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) or major reform packages like Agenda 2000 are not what can be termed 'spot markets', where governments and EU institutions relatively effortlessly sit down and find and agree upon a deal that both maximizes utility gains while reflecting patterns of relative actor power. Recent advances point out that these types of complex negotiations are not self-organizing, which means that the 'demand' for cooperation amongst governments does not necessarily create its own supply of efficient agreements (TaUberg, 2004 (TaUberg, , 2006 Beach and MazzuceUi, 2007) . Factors such as agenda overload and issue complexity can act as a barrier for agreement, creating the risk that either inefficient outcomes are reached or even that the negotiations collapse. Negotiation theory points out that the provision of leadership is a necessity to overcome these transaction cost related factors and is a crucial intervening variable between actor preferences and outcomes.
Yet who provides leadership matters. Would the SEA have been as ambitious and far-reaching a document if the Commission had not been informally granted control of the agenda by the Luxembourg Presidency? Would the Eastern enlargement with ten states have been successfully concluded in the manner that is was in 2002 if an opponent of enlargement held the Presidency instead of pro-enlargement Denmark?
While many scholars acknowledge its importance, leadership has been a quite vacuous theoretical concept in political science/ international relations. What we have often seen have been studies that focused upon the 'great men' (and women) and their impact, with the inevitable over/underestimation of his or her influence depending upon the author's interpretation of the person. In recent years the concept of leadership has been utilized in a more systematic fashion, both within political science/international relations more generally, and within EU studies more specifically. We have seen the use of principal-agent theorizing on leadership, with scholars looking at legislative politics (Fiorina and Shepsle, 1989) , executive politics and delegation (Pollack, 2003; Tallberg, 2006) , along with the broader IR literature on regime creation and change and interstate negotiations (Young, 1991; Zartman, 2003) .
Common to these approaches is the contention that leadership is a necessary condition for the conclusion of efficient intergovernmental negotiations due to high transaction costs. Transaction costs can range from the costs of gathering and analysing all of the information necessary to understand a given negotiating context, to the difficulties of finding mutually beneficial deals in situations where communication is difficult and actors have incentives to exaggerate their bottom lines. Complex, multiparty negotiations are therefore not necessarily efficient, given that transaction costs can present formidable barriers between the 'best deal possible' and what can actually be attained (for an accessible introduction to the debate on transaction costs and their impact upon negotiations, see Scharpf, 1997) .
Leadership is usually defined as the exercise of functions that help the parties overcome transaction costs that hinder efficient collective action, enabling the attainment of more efficient outcome than would have occurred without coordination. These functions can either be functions formally delegated by the parties, such as the chair, or be a more informal delegation of agenda-setting or brokerage powers, where the parties ask an actor to manage the agenda, table proposals that potentially form focal points for further discussions, and help find and broker compromises without granting them formal powers. This definition of leadership echoes what Young termed 'instrumental' leadership (Young, 1991) .
While outcomes can, at least in theory, be pushed through the Council using majority votes and where the Commission enjoys significant institutional powers, in the history-making decisions, such as treaty reform, enlargements or major reform packages, negotiations are intergovernmental and all governments have to agree unanimously. Given this need for consensus, the concept of leadership used to study these history-making decisions should be differentiated from the leadership theories used in hegemonic stability theory, where the focus is upon the need for a hegemonic actor to provide public goods (Kindleberger, 1981 (Kindleberger, , 1986 , and from the supranational bargaining theory developed by Haas (1961) , where strong supranational powers enable the leader to 'upgrade the common interest'.
Leadership alone is naturally not sufficient for a negotiation to reach a mutually acceptable, Pareto-efficient outcome: there must be some form of political demand for agreement amongst the parties. Yet, as I develop in the following, the provision of leadership is a necessary
